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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I

STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

i

ROBERT PAUL PACHECO#

t

Case No. 880281-CA

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of burglary in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978) and theft, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978),
following a jury trial in Third District Court, in and for Salt
Lake County, the Honorable David S. Young, Judge, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp.
1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the pretrial identification procedures were
so unduly suggestive that defendant's due process rights were
violated and whether he was so prejudiced he is entitled to a new
trial•
2.

Whether the admission into evidence of a photo

array prejudiced defendant by informing the jury that he has
prior criminal convictions. Whether defendant properly preserved
for appeal the issue of whether the trial court committed error

in determining that defendant could be impeached by introduction
of a prior conviction.
3.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain

defendant's convictions for burglary and theft.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witnes.s against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution (in part):
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah:
Sec. 7. [Due Process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law.
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-6-202 (1978):
Burglary - (1) A person is guilty of
burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully
in a building or any portion of a building
with intent to commit a felony or theft or
commit an assault on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling,
in which event it is a felony of the second
degree.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978):
Theft - Elements - A person commits theft if
he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-19(c) (1982):
(c) No party may assign as error any
portion of the charge or omission therefrom
unless he objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid manifest
injustice.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-30(a) (1982):
Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect the substantial rights
of a party shall be disregarded.
Utah R. of Evid. 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
it is probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah R. of Evid. 609.

Impeachment be evidence of conviction of crime.

General rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him
or established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the
punishment.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, was charged with
burglary, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann,
S 76-6-202 (1978) and theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978).

He was convicted as charged

following a jury trial on March 24 and 25, 1988.

He was

sentenced to not less than one nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison on the burglary conviction and to six months on
the theft conviction; the sentences were ordered to run
concurrently.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 7, 1987, Katherine and Ray Welch were
burglarized (T. 28). While they were working in their backyard,
a man, later identified as the defendant, knocked on their front
door (T. 17-18).

The man went into the house and stole money

from both Mr. and Mrs. Welches' wallets (T. 38). Mr. Welch
discovered the man when he went to the house for a jacket (T.
36).

The man fled from the house, ran across the lawn, jumped a

fence, ran to his car parked nearby and sped away (T. 37).
On the day in question, Josephine Eward, who lives
directly across the street from Mr. and Mrs. Welch, saw a white
and blue Nova drive up and park near the Welches' home (T. 1213).

She saw a man get out of the car and approach the door (T.

14).

She was aware that the Welches were in their backyard as

the man knocked two or three times on the front door (T. 18).
She only saw his back, but noted the shirt he was wearing and
noticed that he was thin (T. 17). Defendant is 5'6M and weighs

130 pounds (T. 84). Mrs. Eward did not see defendant enter the
house, but later saw the man suddenly run down the porch stairs
and across the lawn, jump the fence, get into his car and quickly
drive away (T. 18-19).
After working in the backyard, Mr. Welch went to the
house for a jacket and saw someone in his kitchen (T. 36). The
man ran through the dining room, into the hall and out the door
to his blue and white car parked nearby (T. 37). Mr. Welch
yelled at him, but the man continued on (T. 37). When he got to
his car, he turned to look back (T. 37). Mr. Welch observed the
man to be wearing a plaid shirt, but because he had not seen his
face, was unable to identify him (T. 36-38)
Katherine Welch was working in the backyard mowing the
lawn with her husband (T. 25). She heard her husband yell and
ran to the fence as she saw a man go out of the house and run.
She observed that he was slender, moved rapidly, and was wearing
a red and white checkered shirt and beige or tan pants (T. 26).
He ran to a blue and white car and drove away (T. 27).
Connie Luna, who lives "kitty-corner" to the Welches,
got a good look at the man and was able to positively identify
him (T. 61). Mrs. Luna was standing on her porch waiting for her
husband to get home from work when she saw defendant at the
Welches' house; at that time she only saw his back (T. 46).
Later, she heard Ray Welch yell (T. 47). Because Mrs. Luna
realized something was amiss, she ran across the yard to get a
better look at defendant and yelled "hey you" (T. 47). Defendant
ran to his car and drove off (T. 47). Mrs. Luna was within about

twenty feet of defendant and was able to look at him "full face"
(T. 51-52)•

He was wearing a red checkered shirt which she

described as tweed and beige pants (T. 51). Mrs. Luna was able
to identify clothes introduced at trial as appearing to be the
clothes defendant was wearing on the day he committed the crimes
(T. 55/ 67); the clothes had been seized defendant's home
pursuant to a warrant (T. 80-81).
Mrs. Luna's eye-witness identification is corroborated
by the fact that she was able to describe the car defendant was
driving; the car was a blue and white car and she identified it
in a photograph admitted at trial (T. 47-48).

Not only was she

able to identify the car based upon its appearance, she obtained
the license number of the car before defendant sped away (T. 49).
She could still remember the license number on the day of trial
(T. 49). The car was, in fact, registered to defendant (T. 77).
Mrs. Luna was asked to look at a photo spread about a
week after the incident; she was not able to positively identify
the perpetrator, but identified defendant's photo as the person
who "looked like" the man who committed the crime (T. 56-57).
The photo spread contained black and white drivers license photos
and the photo of defendant was not recent (T. 57, 64). About two
weeks later, she was asked to examine a second photo-spread (T.
58).

The second photo spread contained colored photos (T. 79).

Because the second photo spread contained higher quality photos,
she was able to conclusively identify defendant from the photo
spread (T. 59, 71). The detective did not suggest to Mrs. Luna
that she identify anyone in either photo spread (T. 71).

Mrs. Luna's identification of defendant was
unequivocal.

She was positive that the man she had seen on the

day in question was defendant and identified him in court (T. 56,
61).
Defendant denied having committed the burglary and
theft.

He claimed to have lent his car to his son Troy (T. 116).

He was unable to articulate why he remembered April 7 as the day
when he had lent the car to his son (T. 119-121, 128). He had
lent the car to his son a second time but was unable to identify
with any specificity the second date on which he lent the car (T.
128).
Defendant's girlfriend stated that defendant had not
seen his son Troy since 1986 because he and his son had had a
fight (T. 104). Defendant, however, stated that on April 7 he
loaned the car to Troy after Troy had contacted him and they
"apologized" about their "fued" (T. 116). Because of this
incident, defendant has not seen Troy since April 7 (T. 128).
Troy's stated purpose in borrowing the car was to go to
Heber to get his children (T. 116). Defendant stated that Troy
returned the car at about 5 p.m. (T. 121). Initially he stated
that he had "no idea" whether Troy had the children with him when
he returned (T. 126). He then testified that he had asked Troy
about the children and Troy told him he had taken the children
back to Heber City (T. 127).
Defendant was 42 years old at the time of trial; Troy
was 22 (T. 113, 124). Troy is defendant's biological son (T.
124) and their is apparently some family resemblance (T. Ill);

however, Mrs. Luna identified defendant, not Troy, as being the
perpetrator (T. 56, 61).
Defendant was unemployed at the time of the burglary
and theft (T. 123). At trial he presented medical records
concerning an injury to his leg which he claimed caused him to be
unable to run (T. 117-19).

Defendant's medical records reflected

that he had received treatment in 1984 and in November of 1987;
defendant had not received medical treatment during the relevant
time of April 1987 (126).
Defendant admitted he had made no effort to locate Troy
prior to trial (T. 132). He also did not ask Troy's children or
his mother, people Troy was allegedly with on April 7, about
Troy's whereabouts on that day (T. 131).
Following presentation of the evidence, the jury
deliberated and found defendant guilty as charged (T. 157).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The identification methods utilized by police
authorities were not unduly suggestive, and did not deny
defendant's constitutional right to due process.
utilized two photo spreads.

The police

The first consisted of black and

white photographs; the second consisted of color photographs
which were more recent.

An eye-witness, Connie Luna, identified

defendant in the first photo spread as looking like the
perpetrator.

However, because of the quality of the photographs,

she was unable to be positive.

Consequently, the detective

compiled a second photo spread with better quality photographs.
Mrs. Luna positively chose defendant from the second group of

pictures.

The techniques used by the detective were not unduly

suggestive.

Nevertheless, the eyewitness identification, under

the totality of the circumstances was reliable.

The admission of

the evidence did not deny defendant due process of law.
The second photo spread was admitted at trial and bore
photographs which contained the words "Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office."

Whether these photographs were taken at the time of

jail booking as the result of having committed a crime is outside
the knowledge of an average juror.

Regardless, the photographs

did not link defendant with prior criminal activity.

The photo

spread had probative value and its admission did not inform the
jury that defendant had a prior criminal record.
Defendant has waived the issue of whether he could be
impeached by the use of prior convictions.

The record does not

contain a ruling on this issue. Additionally, defendant, not the
prosecution, introduced this evidence during direct examination.
Connie Luna positively identified defendant as the
person who had committed the burglary.

The eye-witness

identification and other corroborative evidence was sufficient to
establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES UTILIZED BY THE
POLICE IN THIS CASE DID NOT DENY DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Defendant contends that the identification procedures
utilized by Detective LaMont in this case were unduly suggestive
and violated due process rights guaranteed him by the fifth and

fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and by
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

He contends that

the photo spreads utilized in this case were so suggestive that
Connie Luna's identification of him at trial was unreliable and
constitutes reversible error.
In the leading case of Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968), the Supreme Court addressed the defendant's
claim that the use of an unduly suggestive photo array prior to
trial violated his right of due process.

In an opinion by

Justice Harlan, the Court acknowledged the possibility that
showing photographs to witnesses might cause them to err in
identifying criminal suspects.

Ld. at 384. Nevertheless, the

Court recognized the validity of pretrial photographic
identification, stating that "this procedure has been used widely
and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint
both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects
the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them
through scrutiny of photographs."

Ld.

The Court then set forth

the constitutional standard by which photo identification
procedures should be judged:
We are unwilling to prohibit [the employment
of photographic identification], either in
the exercise of our supervisory power or,
still less, as a matter of constitutional
requirement. Instead, we hold that each case
must be considered on its own facts, and that
convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set
aside on the ground only if the photographic
identification procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification. This standard accords

with our resolution of a similar issue in
Stovall v, Denno, and with decisions of other
courts on the question of identification by
photograph.
Id,

(Emphasis added) (citations omitted)•
The competing interests of efficient criminal

investigation and fairness of process to the accused were
similarly dealt with by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v.
Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d 1349 (1972).

While recognizing

that "caution must be observed to see injustice does not result
from the uses of methods which unfairly focus attention upon a
particular suspect," the Court went on to state that "peace
officers should not be unduly hampered in legitimate attempts to
investigate crimes and to seek out and identify those who have
committed them."

Ld. at 1352.

If a claim of injustice in the

identification procedures does arise, the Court posited that the:
circumstances of the individual case should
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court
to see whether in the identification
procedures there was anything done which
should be regarded as so suggestive or
persuasive that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the identification was not a
genuine product of the knowledge and
recollection of the witness, but was
something to distorted or tainted that in
fairness and justness the guilt of innocence
of an accused should not be allowed to be
tested thereby.
Id. (Citations omitted.)
A due process claim will arise, according to the
standard elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in Simmons
and followed by the Utah Supreme Court in Perry, only if the
identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.

In Neil v. Bigqers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the United
States Supreme Court indicated that suggestiveness, alone, is not
sufficient to suppress pre-trial identification.

The Court set

fourth five factors to be considered in determining whether under
the "totality of the circumstances" the identification of a
defendant was reliable even though the confrontation procedure
was suggestive.

First, the trial court must consider the

opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime.

Second, the court must consider the witness' degree

of attention.

Third, the court must consider the accuracy of the

witness' prior description of the criminal.

Fourth, the court

must consider the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness.
Finally, the court must consider the length of time between the
crime and the identification by the witness.
These five factors have also been inferentially adopted
by the Utah Supreme Court.

See State v. Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272,

1273 (Utah 1983); State v. Newton, 657 P.2d 759 n.6 (Utah 1983);
State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 291-92 (Utah 1982), cert.
denied, Wulffenstein v. Utah, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983).

The factors

are very similar to the test set forth by the court in State v.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1980), where the Court stated:
Police identification procedures . . . do
not deny theaccused due process of law
unless, under a totality of the
circumstances, they are so unnecessarily
suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification as to deny the
accused a fair trial. Where an
identification procedure, even though
suggestive, does not give rise to a
substantial likelihood of misidentification,
no due process violation has occurred. In
determining the reliability of the

identification under the totality of the
circumstances, the court must also consider
the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness's degree of attention, the accuracy
of any prior description of the criminal, the
level of certainty demonstrated during the
identification procedure, and the time
between the crime and the identification.
(Footnotes omitted.)
In the present case, the State does not dispute
defendant's contention that only one of four witnesses was in a
position to enable them to identify defendant.

However, one of

those witnesses, Connie Luna, was in a position which enabled her
to identify defendant and she was unequivocal in her
identification.
First and foremost, the identification procedures
utilized by Detective LaMont satisfied the threshold Biggers
requirement and were not unduly suggestive.

Less than a week

after the crime, Mrs. Luna was asked by Detective LaMont to look
at a photo spread (T. 56). The first photo spread contained
black and white photographs which were not recent (T. 56). Mrs.
Luna looked at the photos and tentatively identified the
perpetrator and stated that he "looked like the guy but [she]
wasn't sure- (T. 57). A week or two later (T. 58), Detective
LaMont asked her to look at a second photo spread; Mrs. Luna
identified defendant (T. 58). Mrs. Luna also identified
defendant at trial (T. 56). She was "positive- in her
identification of defendant as the burglar; she explained that
she was sure "'cause that's the guy I saw when I hollered hey you
when I heard Mr. Ray Welch holler at him and he come across the

street.

I was standing right on the edge of the porch and I

jumped off my porch and ran to the back of the yard where my
driveway is and that's where he was parked with the license plate
number.

So I seen him in full view of his faceM (T. 61)

(empha sis added)•
Even if this Court were to find the identification
procedure utilized by the detective to be suggestive, when
examining the five factors outlined by the United States Supreme
Court in Biqqers (which need be considered only if the procedure
was suggestive), it becomes clear that Mrs. Luna's identification
was reliable.
First, Mrs. Luna had an adequate opportunity to observe
defendant at the time he committed the crime.

Mrs. Welch was

standing outside on her porch waiting for her husband to get home
(T. 46). Defendant first drew her attention when he was running
from the Welches' home (T. 46). Although initially she saw him
only from the back, she had an opportunity as he was running to
observe his size and build and the clothes he was wearing.
attention was focused entirely on defendant.

Her

Because she heard

Mr. Welch yell, she knew something was wrong (T. 47). She ran
across the yard to get a better look at defendant and yelled "hey
you" as defendant was running toward his car (T. 47); at one
point defendant looked at her (T. 47). When defendant got to his
car# he paused briefly and turned around (T. 37). Mrs. Luna saw
defendant "full face" from a distance of about twenty feet (T.
51-52).

Because she knew there was a problem, she took great

care to observe as much detail as possible.

She got a good look

at the car and obtained the license plate number (T. 47-49).

As

a result of her attention to detail, Mrs. Luna was still able to
remember the license plate number almost a year later when the
case went to trial (T. 49). Consequently, the first and second
requirements of the Biggers test were satisfied; Mrs. Luna had an
adequate opportunity to observe defendant and gave the matter a
significant degree of attention.
Additionally, Mrs. Luna's prior description of
defendant was accurate.

She observed the clothing defendant was

wearing and described his shirt as being a "red checked shirt
that looked like tweed material and beige colored pants" (T. 51).
She identified clothing at trial that had been seized from
defendant's house pursuant to a search warrant (T. 55, 67). Mrs.
Luna did not describe defendant as being twenty five, as
defendant contends (AB 14); Mrs. Luna did not venture a guess as
to defendant's age (T. 69). While obviously it would have been
helpful if she were able to accurately state his age, she was not
"inaccurate" in her prior description.
The fourth factor of the Biggers test was also
satisfied.

Mrs. Luna demonstrated a marked level of certainty in

her identification of defendant.

Not only was she "positive,"

she was able to articulate why she was positive (T. 56-61).

She

has a rather remarkable memory as demonstrated by her ability to
recall the license plate number of the car at trial (T. 49).
Finally, while the time between Mrs. Luna's observation
of defendant and her identification of him in the second photo
spread was not ideal, the length of time was not so long as to

render the identification unreliable*

Mrs. Luna was unsure of

the dates on which she was shown the photo spreads.

She stated

that the first was about a week after the incident, and the
second was about two weeks after that (T. 56-58).

Detective

LaMont stated that he asked her to look at the second photo
spread during the first of May (T. 76). Consequently, about a
month had lapsed between her observations of defendant and her
definite identification of him.
not necessarily suspect.

A one month period of time is

In fact, in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.

188, 201 (1972), a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the
admissibility of the eyewitness' identification, a seven month
period of time had lapsed between the crime and the witness'
identification of the perpetrator.
Defendant also contends that the fact that his was the
only photo repeated in the second photo spread rendered the
process unduly suggestive.

However, this fact alone is

insufficient to justify such a finding.

State v. Alvarez, 145

Ariz. 370, 701 P.2d 1178 (1985).
When examining the totality of the circumstances, the
identification procedures were not unduly suggestive.
Regardless, when examining the Biggers factors, it is clear that
Mrs. Luna's identification of defendant was reliable.
not a substantial likelihood of misidentification.
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980).

There was

State v.

Defendant's due process

rights guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution and article 1, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution were not violated, and he is not entitled to a new
trial.

POINT II
EVIDENCE RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMES
WAS NOT IMPROPERLY PRESENTED TO THE JURY.
A. The trial court did not commit reversible
error in admitting into evidence a photo
spread from which an eye witness identified
defendant.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in admitting into evidence a second photo
spread from which an eyewitness, Connie Luna, made a positive
identification of defendant.

Defendant claims that introduction

of the photo spread violated his due process rights because of an
alleged imputation of prior criminal activity in the presentation
and nature of the photographs.
The trial court correctly ruled that the photo spread
was not prejudicial in nature and that it would be beyond the
understanding of the jurors that the photographs were taken as
the result of a previous criminal episode of the defendant.
Though the placard in front of the pictures said "Salt Lake
County Sheriff," the phrase was not sufficient to plant in the
minds of the jurors the idea that the pictures were taken in the
course of a previous arrest.

Aside from the placard designation,

the pictures had none of the characteristics which a juror would
associate with an arrest photograph.

The pictures show no dates

or numbers and contain only a full frontal view of the men, not
the typical front and side view a person might associate with an
arrest photograph.

A juror looking at the photo spread could

assume that the pictures were taken by the sheriff's office
purely for identification purposes.

In United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 491 (2d
Cir. 1973), the court approved the admission into evidence a
photo spread containing mugshot photos which had the numbers on
the front excised, and stated:
[W]e felt that the jury may well have
inferred# if their suspicions were aroused as
all, that these were photographs taken at the
time the defendants were arrested on the
charges for which they were then being tried
and were not indicative of earlier contacts
with the law.
The court in Harrington also looked favorably on the
fact that the judge did not allude to anything during the
introduction of the pictures that might have aroused any
suspicions in the minds of the jury.

Likewise, in the present

case, there was no mention by the trial court of anything that
may have aroused the jury's suspicions regarding prior criminal
episodes by defendant.
Courts have struggled with the problem of using mugshot
photographs in the investigatory stages of the criminal process.
While recognizing that there must be limitations on the
admissibility of evidence which may imply prior criminal behavior
on the part of the defendant, courts understand the necessity of
the use of such photographs in investigatory procedures.
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

Simmons

Whether to admit such

photographs during the course of a trial is an evidentiary
determination to be made by the trial court.

State v. McClain,

706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985).
In the instant case, the issue before the jury was one
of the identification of defendant by an eyewitness.

The

photographs from which the witness identified defendant are
relevant evidence.

Relevant evidence is generally admissible.

Utah R. Evid. 402.

In making the determination of relevance,

the trial court must determine the probative value when
juxtaposed to the prejudicial effect.

Utah R. Evid. 403. Given

the nature of the photographs and the issues at trial, the
probative value outweighed any potential undue prejudice.
In State v. Owens# 15 Utah 2d 123 , 388 P.2d 797
(1964), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of a
photo spread containing "mugshots."

In Owens, a store manager

identified the defendant as the individual for whom he had cashed
a forged money order.

The identification took place two or three

days after the crime and was accomplished through the use of a
photo spread containing mugshots.

The Court found the admission

of the photo spread into evidence was relevant to the issue of
identification.
Defendant relies on United States v. Harrington, 490
F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1973) in support of his argument that the photo
spread should not have been admitted.

In Harrington, the court

formulated a three-prong test to determine the admissibility of
mugshots into evidence.

First, the government must have a

demonstrable need to introduce the photographs; second, the
photographs themselves, if shown to the jury, must not imply that
the defendant has a prior criminal record; and third, the manner
of introduction at trial must be such that it does not draw
particular attention to the source of implications of the
photographs.

Ld. at 495.

The Utah courts have not adopted the Harrington
standard and are, therefore, not bound to follow it.

However,

when applying the factors, the photo spread was admissible.
First, the state had a demonstrable need to introduce the photo
spread.

In the instant case, defendant claimed that he was

misidentified by the eyewitness.

In addition, defendant brought

into question the identification procedure utilized by the
police.

Mrs. Luna was asked questions about the second photo

spread; specifically, whether any of the other men in the photo
spread looked like defendant (T. 66). By asking questions
concerning the content of the photo spread and implying its
impropriety, the relevance of the photo spread became even
greater, further justifying its admission into evidence.

Even if

the use of "mugshots" were found to suggest prior criminal
activity, they were nonetheless admissible on the issue of
defendant's identification and the manner in which the
identification was made.

People v. Robinson, 467 N.E.2d 291

(111. App. 1984).
Secondly, the photo spread itself did not inform the
jury that defendant had a prior criminal record.

The trial court

did not find anything in the photo spread itself that would imply
a prior criminal record (T. 93-94).

The jurors may have well

inferred, if, indeed, they had suspicions, that the photographs
were taken for identification procedures only, and were not
associated with prior convictions.

The average juror does not

have such a sophisticated understanding of police procedures in
order to take the quantum leap from an observation of the photo
spread to the knowledge that defendant was a convicted felon.

Finally, the introduction of the photo spread did not
draw undue attention to the source or nature of the photographs.
Based on the Harrington standard, it is evident that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photo spread.
Nothing was done on the part of the trial court or the
prosecution to suggest that the photographs linked defendant to
prior criminal activity.
As set-forth below, defendant—not the prosecution—
informed the jury that he was a convicted felon (T. 115).
Consequently, even if this Court were to find that the photo
spread impermissibly linked defendant with prior criminal
activity, it is clear that the error was harmless.

"Any error,

defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."

Utah R.

Crim. P. 30 (1).
It is well-settled that an appellate court will not
interfere with the trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters
absent a showing "that the court so abused its discretion that
there is a likelihood that injustice resulted."
McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985).

State v.

See also State v.

McCardeU, 652 P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1982); State v. Danker, 599
P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1979).

In the present case, there was not an

abuse of discretion and no injustice resulted; consequently, this
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court on this issue.

B. Defendant has failed to preserve the
issue of whether evidence of his prior
criminal convictions was admissible under
Utah R. Evid. 609,
Defendant filed a motion in limine in which he asked
the trial court to rule that the prosecution be precluded from
impeaching him pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 609 by use of his prior
criminal convictions (R. 37). Defendant failed to obtain a
ruling on the record on this issue.
Consequently, defendant has failed to preserve this
issue for appeal.

It is incumbent on a moving party to obtain a

ruling from a trial court on the substance of a motion in limine.
Failure to obtain a ruling on the record as the result of
oversight, abandonment of the issue, or otherwise, precludes the
movant from raising the issue on appeal.

Feldstein v. People,

159 Colo. 107, 410 P.2d 188 (1966); State v. Knight, 78 N.M. 482,
432 P.2d 838 (1967); Fixico v. State, 735 P.2d 580 (Okla. Cr.
1987); Nealy v. State, 636 P.2d 378 (Okla. Cr. 1981).

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated that it will not rule on matters outside
of the record.

State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984); State

v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92 (Utah 1983), (disavowed on other grounds,
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987).
The record in this case contains defendant's motion in
limine (R. 37). The next reference to prior convictions for Rule
609 impeachment purposes was made by defendant in his own direct
testimony (T. 115). The record contains no ruling from the trial
court.

Consequently, it is impossible for this Court to review

the trial court's determination, if indeed one was made, and this
court should not consider the merits of the issue.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
OF BURGLARY AND THEFT.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of burglary and theft.

The Utah Supreme Court

pointed out in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that
when a defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction, an appellate court should limit the scope of its
review.
,f

[W]e review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." State v. Petree, Utah, 659
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v.
McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982).
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . .M State
v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980);
accord State v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364,
1366 (1983). So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonable be made,
our inquiry stops.
Id. at 345.

This Court has also succinctly stated that unless

there is a clear showing by the appellant of lack of evidence,
the jury verdict will be upheld.

State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d

410, 412 (Utah App. 1987); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392, 393-94 (Utah App. 1987),

A person commits burglary "if he enters or remains
unlawfully in a building . . • with intent to commit a felony or
theft or commit an assault on any person."

If the burglary takes

place in a dwelling, it is a second degree felony.
Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978).

Utah Code

A person commits theft "if he obtains or

exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with
a purpose to deprive him thereof."
(1978).

If the property stolen is valued at $100 or less, the

crime is a class B misdemeanor.
(l)(d).

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404

Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-412

The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each crime.
Ray and Katherine Welch were in their backyard doing
yardwork when the burglary occurred (T. 17-18).

A man matching

defendant's description was seen by a neighbor on the Welches'
porch (T. 14). Defendant unlawfully entered their home and was
surprised by Mr. Welch when he came into the house to get a
jacket (T. 36-37).

Mr. Welch only saw defendant from behind, but

followed him out of the house and yelled at him (T. 37). Mrs.
Welch, hearing her husband yell, came out of the backyard and saw
defendant run out of their front door (T. 25-26).

Another

neighbor, Connie Luna, heard Mr. Welch yell and ran down to the
sidewalk (T. 47). She yelled at defendant and he turned and
looked at her (T. 47) when he was about twenty feet away (T. 51).
Mrs. Luna was able to see defendant "full face" and was able to
later identify him (T. 51-52).
All four witnesses observed the man get into a blue and
white car and drive away (T. 13, 27, 37, 49). Mrs. Luna

identified the car as a Nova and also got the license number of
the car (T. 49). The car was registered to defendant (T. 77).
After the incident took place, Mr. Welch discovered that
somewhere between $4 and $50 had been taken from his and his
wife's wallets (T. 38-39).
Mrs. Luna has a remarkable memory.

Even though the

trial took place almost a year after the burglary, she was able
to recall and relate the license plate number (T. 49). Mrs. Luna
positively identified defendant from a photo spread (T. 55), at
the preliminary hearing (T. 56), and at trial (T. 56). Mrs. Luna
was positive in her identification and did not equivocate.
The evidence supports the jury's conclusion that
defendant committed the burglary and theft.

The evidence was not

so insubstantial or lacking that a reasonable person could not
have reached a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412. Therefore, defendant's convictions
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Robert Paul Pacheco, was properly
convicted of burglary and theft.

For the foregoing reasons, and

any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of
Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
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